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BOOK REVIEWS
LIONS UNDER THE THRONE. By Charles P. Curtis, Jr. Houghton-
Mifflin Co., Boston, 1947. Pp. 361. $3.50.
THE NINE YOUNG MEN. By Wesley McCune. Harper & Bros., New
York, 1947. Pp. 293. $3.50.
These two books have by now been reviewed so often that a new
reviewer is compelled either to review the reviews or to talk about some-
thing other than the books. Herewith is a little of each.
1.
The McCune book is a miscellany of accounts of recent Supreme
Court decisions interspersed with biographical chapters on each member
of the present Court. It also contains a chapter "covering" in 13 pages
a few anecdotes and six recent Justices. It is, in the words of Professor
Rostow, "a relatively harmless and gossipy piece of journalism, designed
to give the lay public some idea of who the justices are, and what they are
doing." ' The best that can be said has been said by Professor Rodell:
It "could well serve as a starting-point and a handy warehouse for any-
one anxious to take on a more ambitious task." 2
This reviewer, having made more than his own share of factual mis-
takes, must concede that 'error comes easy, particularly in historic41
writing. Such mistakes can easily result from momentary mental lapse
and may not be at all serious-Mr. Curtis' insistence that the Minnesota
Milk Cases involved an Illinois statute is an example of a sort of mental
typographical error.3 Enough such slips occur even when great care is
used, and hence great care ought to be used. The McCune book is chock-
full of trifling errors, regrettable particularly in a book whose main value
is informational. As a layman's book it is, despite the slips, one of the
better summaries.
The Curtis book is quite different, though it sketches many of the
same events. It is informational, but it has ideas enough to compensate
the professional reader who makes his way through a familiar summation
of Old Deal decisions and the Court fight. This is no criticism of the
book, which is written for the 99 per cent of us who can't recall offhand
just what the Carter Coal case was about. The book does not stop with
1937, and its most stimulating passages deal with recent cases.
At times, Curtis, in his effort to write for laymen, may underestimate
them. The Curtis style admits of fair difference of opinion. Professor
Braden thinks "superb prose" what Professor Rostow considers "arch-
ness of style" and Professor Rodell terms "chopped-sentence chit-chat." 4
I found the Curtis mannerisms of the abbreviated sentence and rhetorical
question a serious interruption to easy reading.
1. Rostow, Book Review, 56 YALE L. J. 1469, 1473 (1947).
2. Rodell, Book Review, 56 YALE L. 3. 1462, 1463 (1947).
3. CuRTis 277.
4. Book Reviews, 56 YALE L. J. 1467, 1470, 1463.
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2.
Professor Rodell thinks that Curtis has made Justice Frankfurter
the hero of his book, and draws some conclusions from that belief. This
seems to me wrong. Grant that Curtis chooses to oversimplify a nine-
man Court into three men and a ghost; for under his treatment the cast
is almost entirely Black, Frankfurter and Jackson, with the shade of
Holmes as the omnipresent off-stage noise.5 Grant that he largely omits
consideration of the economic aspects of the Court's work, that he talks
about theories of sovereignty, that he thinks- pretty well of Professor
Thomas Reed Powell-in short, grant that he has a good many points
of view in common with Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Nonethless he divides
laurels. If the book is a race for honors, Justice Frankfurter "wins"
Chapter XVI on personal liberies, but Justice Black "wins" so much of
Chapter XIV as deals with state taxation affecting commerce. One would
suppose from the Curtis expressions at pages 215 and 224 that he would
say of the Frankfurter opinion in Freeman v. Hewit,6 invalidating an ap-
plication of the Indiana gross income tax last year, "By what authority?"
In short, Curtis is no carbon copy. He deserves to be answered on
his own principles, and on some of those principles he seems to this writer
exuberantly wrong.
3.
One problem deservedly puzzling to Mr. Curtis is the extent to which
the intent of the founders, the meaning of the Constitution in 1789, should
influence contemporary decision. His general point of view is expressed
in his first chapter sub-heading: "The limited usefulness of history and
the irrelevance of our forefathers' intentions."
This view he would apply when dealing with punishment for contempt
of court by the press. Thus Bridges v. California,7 limiting the power
of judges to punish for contempt those who criticize the judges' acts, is
scorned as "antiquarian." 8 Just why is not wholly clear from the text.
Yet when Curtis desires to criticize such a view as this, or the minority
view as to right to counsel in state criminal prosecutions, his scorn for
history deserts him. Like most of us, he uses the historical argument when
he finds it on his side. Of right to counsel he says that, in the 18th
Century, states did not require counsel for the indigent; that English
practice up to 1836 was so and so; that the Sixth Amendment was an
innovation. "So"-and note that Curtis' conjunction with history is a
therefore--"So, when a case came up where a judge in Carroll County,
Maryland, refused to assign counsel to a poor defendant . . . the Court
refused to intervene," 9 and refuses yet with the Curtis blessing. Similarly
as to contempt, "Historically judges have always had this power . . ." 10
Constitutional history should not thus catapult from argument's glory
to argument's disgrace depending upon which page of the book one reads.
This may be unfair to Curtis, because he is not primarily interested in the
relation of American legal history to current problems, and if he were, he
5. Quite literally, CURTIs 200-201.
6. 329 U. S. 249 (1946).
7. 314 U. S. 252 (1941).
8. CuRTIs 289.
9. Id. at 287-288.
10. Id. at 291.
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would doubtless refine his analysis. But refinement it needs, for the
function of yesterday's events in relation to today's lawsuits calls for highly
selective judgment. A few off-hand classifications may be ventured:
(1) Some Constitutional phrases were so obviously written in the
context of a world different from our own that the exact meaning of the
Founding Fathers is merely a historical curio. Both Marshall and Hughes
uttered the abstraction that Congress may regulate that which "affects
commerce," but these utterances 113 years apart of course did not refer
to the same things. Marshall probably would never have believed in
1824 that Congress had power to regulate wages in an office building.
As conditions change meaning changes.
(2) There are also Constitutional clauses, as Chief Justice Hughes
pointed out in the Blaisdell case," in which meaning does not change no
matter how much conditions change. For example New York now has
roughly four times as many citizens as the 13 states of 1787 put together,
but it still can have only two Senators.
(3) There are also deliberately ambiguous clauses-the buck passes
of the Constitutional Convention. Some such clauses are well described by
Curtis in his first chapter. They are the clauses in which the Founders
were unable to agree and codified their uncertainty so as to get on to the
next point. Curtis' example of Art. IV, sec. 3, concerning admission of
new states, is a good one.
(4) Only a shade different are the clauses which are deliberate ab-
stractions not because agreement was politically difficult, as in the pre-
ceding paragraph, but because the Fathers knew they could not entirely
foresee future problems, and thus used broad terms for the purpose of
leaving their full content open. "Cruel and unusual punishments," or
"unreasonable searches and seizures" are examples. These phrases, by
their generality, invite the addition of meaning. Assuming that the
Eighth Amendment may be included within the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth, the Delaware and Maryland whipping posts should now
be "cruel and unusual punishment" regardless of the status of corporal
punishment in 1789.
(5) The broad goal phrases form another group. These are the
terms which describe general objects of a sort in which our world is not
so changed from that of 1789 as to have robbed the words of meaning. Most
of the Bill of Rights is an example. Commerce in 1948 may be unrecog-
nizably more complex than in 1788, but people still talk and pray in
pretty much the same ways, and their words and prayers are still sup-
pressed in pretty much the same ways. The Constitutional phrases thus
set a minimum for decent conduct. Yet this is a minimum, not a maximum.
"It is'a minimum because the phrases are sufficiently general to permit
of allowance for change of conditions. One such change is the development
of variant methods of suppression, as for example driving persons out of
their jobs because of their political views. Another is the rising moral
standard of the community, a standard implicit in Cardozo's reference
to the concept of "ordered liberty."
(6) There are also Constitutional phrases of general clarity which
are rendered ambiguous in particularly novel situations. This group
cuts across the others. For example, the clause in Article I giving Con-
11. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 426 (1934).
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gress power "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases" over the Dis-
trict of Columbia is about as specific as words can be as to the general
control of the District. In 1940, Congress sought to utilize this power
to permit District residents to use the diversity jurisdiction of federal
courts outside the District.'2 (This power is not given such citizens under
Article III, say the decisions, because the District is not a "state.") The
istory of the District clause shows that the Founders never thought about
this exact problem, although the discussion in the Virginia ratifying con-
vention makes quite clear that they did not intend the District Clause to
permit Congress to exercise any powers outside the District itself.' 3 The
statute illustrates that there are Constitutional clauses as specific as the
Convention could make them, which still leave problems of interpretation
-in which historical research is indicative but not conclusive because a pos-
sible use of the clause never occurred in 1787.
This sort of analysis may itself be all wrong without affecting the
underlying thesis that the relevance or irrelevance of constitutional history
to current problems depends upon the particular clause, and indeed even
upon the particular problem within a clause. Curtis to the apparent con-
trary on both points, our forefathers' intentions are not generally an "ir-
relevance;" and at the same time a man should not be tried without
counsel in 1948 because state-appointed counsel may not have been
"generally regarded as an inherent fundamental right" in 1789.14 Whether
the Sixth Amendment is treated as a broad goal phrase in the fifth category
above, or whether the measure is as Mr. Curtis states it, "a common sense
of justice," 15 the fairness of a criminal trial should not depend upon
whether the defendant is a man of means.
The most articulate, if not the most applied, portion of the Curtis
theory of law and history is his conviction, expressed in his first two
pages, that we are "getting older and wiser ;" that our forefathers made
plans but that "there is no reason why we should feel we have to carry
out their plans for us ;" indeed, "They may sit in at our councils. There
is no reason why we should eavesdrop on theirs."
Though we may loosen our bonds with the past, we should not gambol
quite so freely. For the storm is coming, and much that we prize may
be swept away if we do not hold with relentless tenacity to some plans our
forefathers made for us. Else we may have only that historian's con-
solation which Jefferson expressed when he observed on the momentary
destruction of speech and press in the administration of Adams, "It is still
certain that tho' written constitutions may be violated in moments of pas-
sion or delusion, yet they furnish a text to which those who are watchful
may again rally and recall the people: they fix too for the people principles
for their political creed." 16
John P. Frank.t
12. 54 STAT. 143 (1940).
13. There was in 1788 a genuine fear that Congress might grant District residents
special privileges outside the District, an argument which was countered with the
assurance that "This exclusive power is limited to that place solely." Remarks of
Pendleton in 3 ELLIOT, DEBATEs IN TH5E STATE CONVENTIONS 440 (2d ed. 1901). Cf.
comments of Mason, id. at 431, and discussion generally, id. at 430-440.
14. CuRTis 288.
15. Ibid.
16. Jefferson to Priestly, June 19, 1902, 5 Doc. HIST. CoNST. 259-260 (1905). For
a criticism of slavery to historical research, see Frank, The United States Supreme
Court 1946-47, 15 U. oF CHI. L. REv. 49, 50 (1947).
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University Law School.
